THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN STATE
COMPULSORY MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE SCREENING
STATUTES AND FEDERAL
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
In recent years legislatures in many states have enacted statutes
requiring plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions to present their
claims to a review board or screening panel before commencing legal
proceedings in the appropriate court of law. The screening panel receives evidence regarding the malpractice claim, and only after the
panel has issued its conclusions may the malpractice plaintiff begin customary legal proceedings. The question arises whether a federal court,
exercising diversity jurisdiction, is bound by these state medical malpractice screening requirements and therefore must dismiss the complaint of a plaintiff who has not complied with them. Most federal
courts that have faced the issue have interpreted Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins' and its progeny 2 to require that the medical malpractice
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie held that the Rules of Decision Act required federal courts in
diversity actions to apply not only the appropriate state statutes but also the appropriate judicially
created common law of the state. The Court determined that it was unconstitutional for the federal courts to ignore the law created by the state courts and to declare its own "substantive rules of
common law applicable in a State." 304 U.S. at 78.
The Rules of Decision Act provides: "The laws of the several states except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
2. The Supreme Court cases interpreting Erie include Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Woods v. Interstate Realty
Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
The Court in Guaran&y Trust held that if an action would be barred in a state court by the
state statute of limitations, a federal court could not take cognizance of it in a diversity action.
Guaranty Trust maintained that
in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity
of citzenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be
substantially the same, so far as legal rules can determine the outcome of a litigation, as
it would be if tried in a State court.
Id. at 109. A statute of limitations that would bar recovery completely in a state court action "so
intimately affect[s] recovery or non-recovery" that a federal court must follow the statute in a
diversity case. Id. at 110.
In Woodr, the court held that when Mississippi law voided a contract because one of the
parties thereto was doing business in Mississippi without being qualified to do so under a Mississippi statute, a federal court in that state could not enforce the contract. The Woods court declared that the Guaranty Trust case
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complaint not be heard until the plaintiff has followed the state's
3
mandatory review procedure.

This Comment will begin with an introduction to various state
medical malpractice review statutes and a statement of the dilemma

faced by federal diversity courts sitting in states with such statutes. The
Comment will argue that the holding of the majority of the courts is

unsound, and that the Erie line of cases, as well as the supremacy of
federal diversity jurisdiction, frees the federal courts from the obliga-

tion to yield to the mandates of state medical malpractice screening
systems.
was premised on the theory that a right which local law creates but which it does not
supply with a remedy is no right at all for purposes of enforcement in a federal court in a
diversity case; that where in such cases one is barred from recovery in the state court, he
should likewise be barred in the federal court.
337 U.S. at 538.
In Byrd, the court held that despite South Carolina state court decisions that the court should
determine whether a plaintiff is an employee of the defendant for purposes of the state's Workmen's Compensation Act, the plaintiff in a federal court diversity action is entitled to have the
issue decided by a jury. The Supreme Court could find "nothing to suggest that [the South Carolina] rule was announced as an integral part of the special relationship created by the statute." 356
U.S. at 536. The requirement that a judge determine the issue was "merely a form and mode of
enforcing the [Workmen's Compensation Act] immunity ... and not a rule intended to be bound
up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties." Id. The outcome of a personal
injury case might be substantially affected, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. at 109-10, by
whether the issue of immunity is decided by a judge or a jury. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop., 356 U.S. at 537. However, "the federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact
questions,. . . [characterized by the court as a "countervailing consideration," should not] yield
to the state rule in the interest of furthering the objective that the litigation should not come out
one way in federal court and another way in the state court." Id. at 538.
In Hanna, the Court held that in a diversity case, service of process should be subject to the
standards of FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(l) rather than to the state law requirements. The Court noted
that the "outcome-determination" test of GuarantyTrust "cannot be read without reference to the
twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." 380 U.S. at 468. Under the facts of Hanna, the plaintiff, in choosing
between the federal and the state forums, was not facing a situation where application of the state
rule would wholly bar recovery; abiding by state law would mean just a minor change in the way
in which process was served. Moreover, permitting service upon the defendant's wife rather than
requiring in-hand service under state law does not alter "the mode of enforcement of state-created
rights" to a degree necessary to raise the Erie concern of inequitable administration of the laws.
Id. at 469.
3. See Edelson v. Soricelli, Nos. 78-2627 & 79-1012 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1979); Woods v. Holy
Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979); Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 472 F. Supp.
468 (E.D. La. 1979); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind.), aj'd, 603 F.2d
646 (7th Cir. 1979); Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 778 (D. Md. 1978);
Wells v. McCarthy, 432 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Mo. 1977); Marquez v. Hahnemann Medical College
& Hosp., 435 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Flotemersch v. Bedford County Gen. Hosp., 69 F.R.D.
556 (E.D. Tenn. 1975). But see Edelson v. Soricelli, Nos. 78-2627 & 79-1012 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1979)
(Roserm, J., dissenting); Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978).
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COMPULSORY MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SCREENING PANEL
STATUTES

In response to the increasing number of medical malpractice
claims and the consequent rise in malpractice insurance rates, 4 many
state legislatures have enacted statutes requiring preliminary review of
malpractice allegations.5 The legislatures have apparently perceived
shortcomings in the jury trial as a means of resolving medical malpractice claims. Jury trials increase the cost of malpractice insurance; the
slowness of jury trials forces patients, who desperately need money to
pay medical bills, to settle for less than their claims are worth; and the
4. See Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Const/tutionalImplications, 55 TEx. L. REv. 759, 759-60 (1977). See generally Margolick, Medation Isn't
Curefor Patients' Claims, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 4, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
5. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.535-.560 (Michie Supp. 1979); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12561 to -569 (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6801-6821 (Michie Supp. 1978); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.40-.51 (West Supp. 1978); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 671-1 to -20 (Supp. 1979);
IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1001 to -1013 (Bobbs-Merrill 1979 & Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-91 to -10 (Bums Supp. 1979); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47-.48 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980);
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (Michie Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 538.010-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 17-1301 to -1315 (Allen Smith
Supp. 1977); NEv. REv. STAT. § 41A.010-.120 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-1 to -28 (Michie
1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.1-01 to -10 (Allen Smith Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§§ 1301.301-.606 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-19-1 to -10 (Bobbs-Merriil
Cum. Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3401 to -3421 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1979); VA. CODE
§§ 8.01-581.1 to -. 12:2 (Michie 1977 & Supp. 1979).
Provisions in state medical malpractice review statutes have raised federal and state constitutional issues. See generally Redish, supra note 4. The Florida Supreme Court has ruled that the
state's medical malpractice screening statute limiting the jurisdiction of the mediation panel to ten
months violates the due process clauses of the United States and the Florida Constitutions. Aldana v. Holub, Nos. 53,612 & 53,227 (Fla., Feb. 28, 1980). The Supreme Court of Missouri has
held that the Missouri screening statute violates art. I, § 14 of the Missouri Constitution by limiting access to the state courts. State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. for Children v.
Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979). In Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977),
the Supreme Court of Arizona concluded that a provision of the Arizona Medical Malpractice Act
that required the nonprevailing party before the review panel to post a bond before proceeding to
trial violated the Arizona Constitution's privileges and immunities clause, ARIz. CONST. art. II,
§ 13. Other provisions of state medical malpractice review statutes have withstood constitutional
challenge. See, e.g., Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979) (Fla. statute);
Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. La. 1979) (La. statute); Hines v.
Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind.), a]j'd,603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979) (Ind. statute);
Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 778 (D. Md. 1978) (Md. statute); Eastin v.
Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977) (Ariz. statute); Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802
(Fla. 1976) (Fla. statute), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1979); Butler v. Flint-Goodridge Hosp. of
Dillard Univ., 354 So. 2d 1070 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (La. statute); Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Johnson,
282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (Md. statute), appealdismissed,439 U.S. 805 (1978) (dismissed for want
of substantial federal question); Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d
932 (1978) (Pa. statute).
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lack of predictability of jury 6verdicts makes it difficult to pursue an

intelligent settlement strategy.
State legislatures created screening panels to provide a quick pretrial review of medical malpractice claims.7 This review is designed to
prevent malpractice actions against health care providers from being

filed in court when "the facts do not permit at least a reasonable inference of malpractice."8 Another purpose of the screening panel require-

ment is to encourage settlement. By giving the parties a preliminary
view of the merits of the case, the review panel procedure aids them in
negotiating a settlement. Indeed, it puts them under pressure to settle. 9
Settlement of a malpractice claim reduces litigation costs and avoids
submission of the negligence issue to a jury; jury verdicts, often "allegedly ill-founded or unreasonable,"' 0 are believed to be much higher
than settlement figures." Furthermore, proceedings before a screening

panel and consequent settlement also avoid or minimize publicity that
6. See Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the MedicalMalpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417, 1455.
7. See id. 1456. The Pennsylvania legislature, for example, has declared that its purpose
was "to establish a system through which a person who has sustained injury or death as a result of
tort or breach of contract by a health care provider can obtain a prompt determination and adjudication of his claim and the determination of fair and reasonable compensation." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.102 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.020(3) (Vernon
Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-034030 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1979).
8. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 17-1302 (Allen Smith Supp. 1977); see Berkman, Alternatives
to Medical Malpractice Litigation, 12 FORUM 479, 487 (1977); Project, Medical-Legal Screening
Panels as an Alternative Approach to MedicalMalpractice Claims, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 695,
705 (1972).
9. Comment, supra note 6, at 1456.
10. Berkman, supra note 8, at 479.
11. Redish, supra note 4, at 767. The medical malpractice plaintiff and defendant who ultimately appear before a screening panel will still incur legal expenses for the fees of attorneys who
prepare their cases and represent them before the panel. Nonetheless, if the review proceedings
are conducted more expeditiously than ordinary litigation, and ordinary litigation does not follow
the review proceedings, expenses of the parties will be reduced. If the parties resort to ordinary
litigation after completion of the review process, however, the legal fees associated with ordinary
malpractice litigation are increased by the addition of the review stage.
The parties appearing before a medical malpractice review panel may also be liable for the
costs of administering the review panel program. In some states, review panels are funded by
assessments on health care providers who practice in the state. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 1301.304 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980). Under other statutes, both parties bear the review panel
expenses. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44(2)(i) (West Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.10
(Michie 1977 & Supp. 1979). Other plans for funding review panels include the imposition of
panel costs on the party in whose favor the panel decides, see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.47 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980), or giving the panel authority to assess costs up to a certain
amount on the party against whom the panel opinion is rendered, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
18, § 6813 (Michie Supp. 1978). The review panel may even be financed by a tax on malpractice
insurers. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.055 (Vernon Supp. 1980). Arizona has provided that
the panel expenses shall be paid by the state out of funds appropriated for the purpose. ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(M) (West Supp. 1979).
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might harm the professional reputation of the malpractice defendant. ' 2
Most state statutes require that the plaintiff undergo the screening

process even before he files suit. 13 The screening panel is normally

composed of members of the medical and legal professions 14 who are

selected in a process that frequently involves the court, medical and
legal professional organizations, and the parties themselves.' 5
The medical malpractice screening system has many of the attributes of a civil judicial proceeding. The panel receives written evidence
from the parties' 6 and listens to oral testimony of witnesses under oath

during a hearing.' 7 The panel usually has the right to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence.'

8

The screening

panel statutes often give the parties the rights of discovery they would
enjoy in an ordinary civil suit.' 9 In some states, the rules of evidence
must be observed in the hearings before the panel; 20 in others, the evi-

dence rules are relaxed. 2 ' Other elements of a traditional trial, such as
24
23
pleadings, 22 opening and closing statements, and cross-examination,

are utilized under several of the state plans. In addition, many of the
statutes give the panel authority to appoint expert medical witnesses to
25
aid in understanding'the case.

Sometime after the conclusion of the hearing the screening panel
issues a report of its findings. The decision of the panel can take any of

several forms, but generally there is a ruling on the issue of the defend12. Berkman, supra note 8, at 487; Redish, supra note 4, at 767; Project, supra note 8, at 705.
13. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44(l)(a) (West Supp. 1978).
14. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-17(D) (Michie 1978).
15. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 32.29.1-04 (Allen Smith Supp. 1979). Under the North
Dakota system the state medical association compiles a list of physicians who are licensed to
practice in the state. The state bar association compiles a similar list of attorneys. The malpractice claimant and potential defendant each nominate one physician and one attorney to serve on
the panel. Either party may challenge a nomination without cause. The party whose nominee has
been challenged then selects another nominee. If two or more challenges are made, the judge
compiles a list of three physicians or attorneys, from which each party strikes one name. The
remaining physician or attorney becomes the nominee. The physicians and attorneys selected
then nominate, from a list compiled by the court, a citizen member to serve on the panel. Finally,
the judge appoints the nominees to serve on the panel. Id.
16. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(D) (West Supp. 1979).
17. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6808 (Michie Supp. 1978).
18. See, e.g., HAwAI REV. STAT. § 671-13 (Supp. 1979).
19. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-05(b) (Michie Supp. 1980).
20. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.307(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980).
21. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 8.01-581.6(2) (Michie 1977 & Supp. 1979).
22. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-04(a) (Michie Supp. 1980).
23. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567(E) (West Supp. 1979).
24. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44(6) (West Supp. 1978).
25. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-5 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1978).
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ant's negligence. 26 Upon a finding of negligence the screening panel is
frequently required or permitted to reach a conclusion as to the extent
27
of the plaintiffs injuries or monetary damages.

The statutes generally provide that either party may reject the
findings of the review board. 28 Upon rejection of the findings, the medical malpractice plaintiff may begin his traditional lawsuit in a court of

general jurisdiction.29 The statutes differ on the question of the admissibility of the panel's findings into evidence. 30 Regardless of the findings of the screening panel, and whether or not they are admissible in
evidence in subsequent malpractice litigation, the plaintiff may proceed
with a traditional trial that determines de novo the issue of the defendant's liability and the plaintiff's damages.
II.

FEDERAL COURTS AND STATE SCREENING REQUIREMENTS:
THE MAJORITY VIEW

Assume that State A, the domicile of a medical malpractice defendant, has a compulsory medical malpractice screening panel statute.
The plaintiff, a citizen of State B, brings his action in a federal district
court sitting in State A, alleging damages that exceed $10,000. The
plaintiff has not complied with the screening requirement of State A's
statute, the applicable law. On the basis of the plaintiff's failure to submit his complaint to the screening panel for initial review, the defendant moves that the court dismiss the plaintiffs complaint. The
defendant argues that the Erie doctrine 3' requires a federal district
court, exercising diversity jurisdiction, to conform to the applicable
state malpractice review statute. Accordingly, he argues, the federal
court must decline to hear the case until the parties have undergone the
screening process. In opposition the plaintiff argues that the Erie doctrine does not require the federal court to obey the mandates of the
state statute. This, then, is the issue presented to the federal courts:
whether Erie and its progeny compel federal courts exercising diversity
26. The state statutes typically require the panel to determine whether or not "the evidence
supports the conclusion that the defendant or defendants failed to meet the appropriate standard
of care." LA. REv.STAT. ANN. § 40:1299-47(G) (West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
27. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.045 (Vernon Supp. 1980). Contra, NEv. REv.STAT.
§ 41A.060(2) (1977).
28. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3403(d) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1979).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(e) (Michie Supp. 1979) (report of panel is admissible
in evidence); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.050 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (recommendations of review board
are not admissible in evidence).
31. See notes 1 & 2 supra.
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jurisdiction to comply with state medical malpractice compulsory review statutes.
The great majority of the federal courts that have faced this ques-

tion have held that a medical malpractice plaintiff desiring to sue in
federal court must pass through the state-mandated screening proce-

dure before commencing litigation. 32 The courts adopting this view
have employed several rationales derived from Erie and its progeny.
First, the decisions have noted that "the policy underlying the Erie doctrine is to eliminate discrimination against citizens of the state and to
discourage forum shopping." 33 If federal diversity courts did not re-

quire medical malpractice plaintiffs to comply. with the screening pro34
cedure, the result would be discrimination in favor of nonresidents.

"Plaintiffs in diversity actions would have a definite and significant advantage not available to state court plaintiffs. This advantage . . .

would encourage forum shopping between the state and federal judicial
systems. Such a result is incompatible with Erie. ' 35 This discrimination and forum-shopping rationale seems to be derived from a sentence
37
in Hanna v. Plumer3 6 and from dicta in Erie.
The second Erie-type rationale on which the majority-rule courts
have based their decision is the "door-closing" doctrine. This doctrine
"precludes maintenance in the federal courts of suits to which the state
has closed its courts." ' 38 Since the state court would close it doors to the

same medical malpractice action, "at least until the arbitration proceeding required by law is completed, ' 39 "that same result should obtain when suit is filed in federal court."' 40 This rationale is derived from
32. See cases cited in note 3 supra.
33. Wells v. McCarthy, 432 F. Supp. 688, 689 (E.D. Mo. 1977); see Edelson v. Soricelli, Nos.
78-2627 & 79-1012, slip op. at 22 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1979); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d
1164, 1170 (5th Cir. 1979); Marquez v. Hahnemann Medical College and Hosp., 435 F. Supp. 972,

973 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
34. Edelson v. Soricelli, Nos. 78-2627 & 79-1012, slip op. at 22 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1979); Wells
v. McCarthy, 432 F. Supp. 688, 689 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
35. Edelson v. Soricelli, Nos. 78-2627 & 79-1012, slip op. at 22 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1979); see
Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1.168 (5th Cir. 1979).
36. 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) ("The 'outcome-determination' test therefore cannot be read
without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping hnd avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws"). For a general description of Hanna, see note 2
supra.

37. Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens. It
made rights enjoyed under the unwritten "general law" vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court; and the privilege of selecting
the court in which the right should be determined was conferred upon the noncitizen.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938).
38. Marquez v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., 435 F. Supp. 972, 973 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
39. Id.
40. Wells v. McCarthy, 432 F. Supp. 688, 689 (E.D. Mo. 1977); see Edelson v. Soricelli, Nos.
78-2627 & 79-1012, slip op. at 6 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1979).
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the Supreme Court's holding in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.41 that a
contract that was void or unenforceable in Mississippi courts could not
be enforced by a federal diversity court in Mississippi. "[W]here in
such cases one is barred from recovery in the state court, he should
'42
likewise be barred in the federal court."
The court in Davison v. Sinai Hospitalof Baltimore, Inc., 43 basing
its decision on a sentence from the Supreme Court's opinion in
Hanna,44 held that under the Erie doctrine, the "character" of litigation of a state claim in federal court must not materially differ from the
character of litigation of the same claim in a state court. The absence
of the screening process from federal litigation would constitute such a
material difference.
It is clear that the character of litigation would differ drastically
if plaintiffs in Maryland state courts were required to submit their
claims to an arbitration panel prior to bringing suit and plaintiffs in
this court were not. Such a difference may or may not ultimately
affect the result or outcome of the litigation. It certainly does, however, change the nature of the initial stages of the litigation and ultimately of the trial,45given that the findings of the panel are admissible
in a trial de nOVO.
Two courts requiring plaintiffs' compliance with the screening
panel procedures have characterized the completion of such procedure
as a condition precedent to enforcement of the medical malpractice
46
claim against the defendant.
Finally, federal courts examining the applicability of medical malpractice review requirements have interpreted Erie as a prohibition of
41. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
42. Id. at 538.
43. 462 F. Supp. 778 (D. Md. 1978).
44. "The Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization that it would be unfair for the characteror
result of a litigation materially to differ because the suit had been brought in a federal court."
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 467, quoted in Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 462 F.
Supp. at 780 (emphasis added). For a general description of Hanna, see note 2 supra.
45. 462 F. Supp. at 780. There are apparently no other federal decisions explaining or particularly employing the phrase, "character. . .of a litigation," which appears in the Hanna opinion,
380 U.S. at 467. It appears, then, that the phrase, as unessential dictum, has had little precedential
force in Erie cases.
46. The court in Flotemersch v. Bedford County Gen. Hosp., 69 F.R.D. 556 (E.D. Tenn.
1975), held that "the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the prerequisites for relief under
the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Review Board and Claims Act of 1975 . . .were satisfied or
...
Id. at 557. In that case the statutory condition precedent had not been
have been excused.
performed. Id. The Third Circuit has described the Pennsylvania malpractice screening requirement as "a condition precedent to entry into the state judicial system." Edelson v. Soricelli, Nos.
78-2627 & 79-1012, slip op. at 7 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1979) (emphasis added); accord,Hines v. Elkhart
Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421,425 (N.D. Ind.), aI'd,603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979) (Indiana screenig requirement described as a "statutory condition of precedent to the filing of malpractice claims
within the diversity judisdiction of this Court").
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federal court interference with a state legislature's attempt to achieve a
legitimate objective. If out-of-state plaintiffs were able to prosecute
their medical malpractice claims in federal court without passing the
review panel hurdle, the state's ability to achieve its goal of reducing
the occurrence of high jury verdicts and harmful publicity would be
frustrated. 47
Courts, then, have relied on dicta extracted from the text of the
opinions of Erie and its progeny. Even when the very general dicta of
the Erie line of cases provide the only guidance in this area, these
courts fail to acknowledge the potential contrary result that other plausible interpretations of the dicta would indicate. More important, the
courts ignore the strong federal interest in preserving the federal courts'
diversity jurisdiction from erosion by state-created limitations on the
litigation process. The following sections examine in more detail the
Erie doctrine, consider the federal interests implicated in state screening requirements, and conclude that the holdings of these courts are
erroneous.
III.

FEDERAL COURTS AND THE STATE SCREENING REQUIREMENTS:

AN OPPOSING VIEW

A.

48

The Erie Doctrine.

A careful reading of ErieRailroad v. Tompkins4 9 and subsequent

Supreme Court cases 50 indicates that the Erie doctrine does not compel
a federal diversity court to require a medical malpractice plaintiff to
complete the screening process before filing his claim. The Erie decision itself focused on two central considerations. First, the Court found
47. The Fifth Circuit has addressed the problem of federal court interference with Florida's
proposal for reducing the costs associated with malpractice litigation and liability.
As we have observed, the Florida Legislature acted in 1975 to avert what it viewed as an
impending crisis in the health care field. An integral part of its action was to require
malpractice claimants to submit their claims to mediation, "thereby reducing the cost of
We would do
medical malpractice insurance and ultimately medical expenses ....
grave damage to the legislative response evidenced by Florida's Medical Malpractice
Law if we refused to apply the mediation requirement in diversity cases. We decline to
take such a step.
Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting Carter v. Sparkman,
335 So. 2d 801, 809 (Fla. 1976)); see Marquez v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., 435 F.
Pennsylvania has attempted to deal with the
Supp. 972, 974 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("By statute ...
medical malpractice crisis that confronts the commonwealth and the nation. The Pennsylvania
legislature has decided that compulsory arbitration may ameliorate this crisis. This court will not
interfere with such expression of legislative intent"). For the source of this "noninterference ra*tionale," see text accompanying note 53 infra.
48. See generally Turner, Medical Malpractice Arbitration on the Erie Railroad, 11 U.
TOLEDO L. REv. 1 (1979).
49. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
50. See note 2 supra.
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it necessary to end the Swift v. Tyson 51 tradition of federal, judge-made
law in diversity cases because it had created "grave discrimination by
non-citizens against citizens."' 52 Second, the Erie Court believed that a
federal court's failure to heed the state's judicially created law as well
as its statutory law in enforcing state-created rights in diversity suits
"invaded rights which. . . are reserved by the Constitution to the sev'53
eral states."
It is uncertain that the failure of a federal court to dismiss the
claim of a plaintiff who has not obtained a decision from the stateordained review board would introduce the kind of grave discrimination that worried the Erie Court or would constitute an invasion of
state rights. Erie's Supreme Court progeny support the proposition
that federal courts are not obliged to dismiss malpractice suits that have
not passed through a state-mandated review procedure. These decisions have distinguished between state laws that create or are bound up
with rights and obligations and those that control the forms, mode,
manner, and means of enforcing such rights and obligations. 54 Federal
courts must heed the former category of state law, but are free to ignore
the latter.
Beyond this dichotomy, the Court has developed several subsidiary tests for use in Erie questions. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 5 5 the
Supreme Court declared that when the applicability of a state statute in
a federal diversity action arises,
[t]he question is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner
and means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is
enforced, or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our problem, namely
does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court
action
to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in 5an
6
upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court?
51. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
52. 304 U.S. at 74. The nonresident plaintiff who met the requirements of diversity jurisdiction had the privilege of choosing the federal court, where the unwritten "general law" would
apply, or the state court, where the state courts' decisions would determine the issue. Resident

plaintiffs had no such choice.
53. Id. at 80. The Court suggested there had been a violation of the tenth amendment, U.S.
CONST, amend. X.
54. A federal court should apply the state rule "if the choice of rule would substantially affect
those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our consitutional system leaves to state
regulation." Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). The federal
court must determine whether the state requirement is "a rule intended to be bound up with the
definition of the rights and obligations of the parties" or "merely a form and mode of enforcing
[such] . . . rights and obligations." Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536
(1958).
55. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
56. Id. at 109.
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Another subsidiary rule derived from Erie provides that when a plaintiff would be barred from recovering on a cause of action in state court,
he must also be barred in a diversity action in a court sitting in that
state.5 7 A third auxiliary Erie standard was developed in Byrd v. Blue
Ridge RuralElectricalCooperative:58 even if a state rule bears substantially on the question whether litigation would come out one way in the
federal court and another way in the state court, if the federal court
fails to apply the rule, state statutes should not be permitted to "disrupt
59
or alter the essential character or function of a federal court."
In an effort to incorporate the rules and distinctions developed under Erie and its progeny, two federal courts of appeals have devised
tests for the application of state law in federal diversity actions. 60 The
more recent of these tests was developed by Judge Celebrezze in Miller
61

v. Davis:

1. If the state provision is the substantive right or obligation
being asserted, the federal court must apply it.
2. If the state provision is a procedural rule which is intimately
bound up with the substantive right or obligation being asserted, the
federal court must apply it.
3. If the state provision is a procedural rule which is not intimately bound up with the substantive right or obligation being asserted, but its application might substantially change the outcome of
the litigation, the federal court should determine whether state interests in favor of applying the state rule outweigh countervailing considerations against application of the rule. If
the state interests
62
predominate, the state rule should be adopted.
Previously, Judge Sobeloff had created a similar set of directives in
57. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183,
191-92 (1947); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945).
[A] right which local law creates but which does not supply with a remedy is no right at
all for purposes of enforcement in a federal court in a diversity case; . . . where in such
cases one is barred from recovery in the state court, he should likewise be barred in the
federal court.
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. at 538.
58. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
59. Id. at 539 (citing Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931)). The ByrdCourt held
that "affirmative countervailing considerations" related to maintaining the federal judiciary as "an
independent system for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction," 356
U.S. at 537, precluded application of a judicially created South Carolina rule. The state rule in
Byrd required the judge, not the jury, to determine whether a party was a statutory employer
under the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act. The Court decided that application of
the South Carolina rule would disrupt "the federal system of allocating functions between judge
and jury." Id. at 538. The state rule would not prevail over "the federal policy favoring jury
decisions of disputed fact questions." Id.
60. Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1974) (Celebrezze, J.); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965) (Sobeloff, J.).
61. 507 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1974).

62. Id. at 314.
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Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp.6 3 The state medical malpractice
screening requirements do not amount to a substantive obligation or
right. The obligation and right in the context of medical malpractice
are the physician's obligation to exercise due care and the patient's
right to recover for damages caused by the physician's failure to exer-

cise that duty. The screening panel procedures do not change this basic
relationship. If the plaintiff proves the necessary elements of a cause of

action for malpractice, he will recover-regardless of the imposition of
the screening panel procedure before trial. Nor can it be said that the
screening panel requirement is intimately bound up with the physician's duty to care or the malpractice victim's entitlement to recover
damages. 64 Since "the requirement appears to be merely a form and
mode of enforcing the [obligation and right] . . .and not a rule in63. 349 F.2d 60, 63-64 (4th Cir. 1965). See also U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 58 F.R.D. 469, 474
(D. Del. 1973). Other federal courts have employed the Szantay test in resolving Erie issues. See
Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 550 F.2d 1320, 1325 (2d Cir. 1977);
Karara v. County of Tazewell, 450 F. Supp. 169, 171-72 (W.D. Va. 1978), aifd,601 F.2d 159 (4th
Cir. 1979); Kahn v. Sturgil, 66 F.R.D. 487, 490 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Poe v. Marquette Cement Mfg.
Co., 376 F. Supp. 1054, 1058 (D. Md. 1974); Smith v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 327 F. Supp. 536,
538 (D.S.C. 1971).
64. "In a diversity case, state law defining and limiting. . . primary rights and obligations
must be applied under the Erie doctrine, enabling members of society prudently to plan and
conduct their affairs, whether their conduct will later be called into question in a state or federal
court." Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061, 1065 (4th Cir. 1969). The screening
panel requirement has nothing to do with "enabling members of a society prudently to plan and
conduct their affairs .... [Such a rule] plays no role in the ordering of the affairs of anyone." Id.
at 1066; see Note, The Law Applied in Diversity Cases.- The Rules of Decision Act and the Erie
Doctrine,85 YALE L.J. 678, 696 (1976). Judge Rosenn, dissenting in Edelson v. Soricelli, Nos. 782627 & 79-1012 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1979), characterized the Pennsylvania screening process as "a
means of regulating the entry to the courtroom" and "a procedural device for allocating cases
within the State of Pennsylvania." Id., slip op. at 33-34. The federal court should not have to
refer the plaintiffs malpractice suit to the review panel, because "[t]he substantive legal rights of
the parties before the panel and the federal court will be the same. Only the forum will differ."
Id. But see Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-57 (1949). In Cohen, the
Court held that a federal court whose jurisdiction was based on diversity must apply a New Jersey
statute making the unsuccessful plaintiff in a shareholder's derivative suit liable for reasonable
expenses of the defense. The statute also permitted the corporate defendant to require the plaintiff
to give security for payment of such expenses as a condition of prosecuting the suit. The Court
noted that the statute "creates a new liability where none existed before" and "conditions the
stockholder's action." Id. at 555-56. State medical malpractice review requirements do not create
any new liability on the part of the plaintiff in the way the New Jersey statute in Cohen did; the
obligation to proceed initially before a review board is substantially different from the monetary
liability for the expenses of the opposing party under the New Jersey provision. The indemnity
bond that defendant could require under the New Jersey statute-a "condition" to the stockholder's action-is distinguishable from the mandate of prior review of claims. The indemnity
bond is intimately related to the possible monetary obligation of the plaintiff, whereas the review
requirement is not related directly to any monetary liability imposed on a malpractice plaintiff.
Contra, Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 603 F.2d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 1979) (the Indiana medical
malpractice screening procedure "is clearly not a mere form or mode for enforcing rights or obligations, but rather the procedure is bound up with those rights and obligations").
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tended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations
of the parties, '6 5 the state review board laws fail the first two parts of
the Miller test.
Under the third part of the Miller test, it is not clear that a federal
court's refusal to abide by the state screening requirement "might substantially change the outcome of the litigation. ' 66 In the case of pretrial medical malpractice review, the plaintiff is not totally barred from
enforcing his cause of action in the state courts as were the plaintiffs in
Woods, Angel, and Guaranty Trust;67 the "door-closing" rationale of
these cases is not applicable here. While it is true that a state court
could dismiss the suit of a plaintiff who has not complied with compulsory screening, such a suit is only delayed, not barred absolutely. The
plaintiff may eventually gain entry to the state court for a trial de novo
if he hurdles a difficult, time-consuming, and expensive procedural ob68
stacle.
Three questions remain under the third part of the Miller test: (1)
what degree of probability of a substantially different outcome is necessary; (2) whether in the medical malpractice review situation this degree of probability exists; and (3) whether the difference in outcome
resulting from a federal court's declining to follow the review requirements would be substantial. The courts have not provided a clear answer to the first question. The Miller test uses the word "might"; 69 the
Szantay test uses the phrase "would substantially affect."'70 The Byrd
decision refers in dicta to the "certainty" and "strong possibility" of a
different result. 7 1 Nothing on the face of the state review panel statutes
indicates that the outcome of a medical malpractice case would vary
substantially depending on whether or not a panel reviews the claim
before trial.72 One can only speculate whether the merits of the plain65. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958).
66. 507 F.2d 308, 314 (6th Cir. 1974).
67. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
68. The absence of the review process would affect substantially the "character" of malpractice litigation, see text accompanying note 45 supra, as well as "the enforcement of the right as
given by the State." Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). The differences in
"character" and "enforcement," however, are not factors in the Miller test and these expressions
have not been specifically employed in Erie analysis in federal court decisions.
69. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
70. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1965).
71. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 539 (1958).
72. Judge Rosenn, dissenting in Edelson v. Soricelli, Nos. 78-2627 & 79-1012 (3d Cir. Nov. 2,
1979), asserted that federal jurisdiction without prior reference to a review panel would not lead to
a result substantially different from that which would be reached by state court litigation preceded
by the screening process. Judge Rosenn insisted that "[o]nly the forum, not the substantive legal
rights, will be different." Id., slip op. at 37.
But see Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956):
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tiffs case (as well as the plaintiffs wallet and patience) will survive the
panel hearing and decision. The likelihood of a different result may be
increased if there is a review panel decision on the merits of the plaintiffs claim and that decision is admitted into evidence in subsequent
litigation of the claim; the jury might be influenced by the conclusions
reached by "the experts. ' 73 Even if the interposition of a pretrial review procedure or the introduction into evidence of panel findings affects the outcome of the litigation, the question still remains whether
the outcome will be changed "substantially." Again, the courts have
not explained the required degree of substantiality. If the mandatory
review procedure induces the plaintiff to drop the malpractice claim on
which he would prevail in the absence of such a requirement, a substantial difference is obvious. But what of the cases where the review
process leads the parties to settlement, or where the introduction into
evidence of the panel findings merely changes the amount of the jury
verdict that would have been reached in the absence of review? Has
4
the outcome of the litigation been substantially changed?7 It is imposIf the federal court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where suit is brought. For the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially affects the cause of
action created by the State. The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action. The change from a court of law
to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ultimate result.
Id. at 203. Bernhardtis distinguishable from the medical malpractice cases in federal courts. In
Bernhardt, the parties entered into an employment contract that contained an arbitration clause.
Under the applicable law of Vermont, contracts to arbitrate disputes were revocable. Thus, Vermont law clearly dealt with the rights and obligations of the parties: the right to escape the obligation to arbitrate. Second, arbitration, if allowed, would be the sole method of deciding the merits
of the disputants' arguments. The decisions of the medical malpractice review panels are not
binding on the parties and the merits of the parties' claims and defenses may be determined in a
trial de novo.
73. Judge Pettine, writing in Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978), maintained
that the admission into evidence in a subsequent jury trial of the screening panel's findings would
significantly affect the jury's decisionmaking. "Panel reference is intended to and will, in fact,
strongly influence the jury verdict or circumvent jury trial altogether." Id. at 225-26. Juries that
have heard the findings of "the court-appointed panel of esteemed professionals who have reviewed all the evidence" will find it difficult to evaluate the evidence independently and reach a
conclusion contrary to that reached by the panel. Id. at 226. The Rhode Island statute provides
that "[all
findings of the panel except as to damages, shall be admissible as evidence in any action
subsequently continued by the appellant in a court of law." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-8 (BobbsMerrill Cum. Supp. 1978); see Margolick, supra note 4, at 1, col. 1 & at 34, col. 3.
74. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), one of the cases from which the third
part of the Miller test is derived, suggests that substantiality of difference in outcome occurs with
respect to state laws which "intimately affect recovery or non-recovery." Id. at 109. If this is the
standard of substantiality, then only when the review procedure per se permits or prevents a malpractice plaintiff from recovering on his claim can it be said that review might substantially affect
the outcome. In Byrd, the Court noted that "[c]oncededly the nature of the tribunal which tries
issues may be important in the enforcement of the parcel of rights making up a cause of action or
defense, and bear significantly upon achievement of uniform enforcement of the right." 356 U.S.
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sible to conclude that in all malpractice cases a different result would

be reached without the insertion of panel review into the litigation
process and, even if so, that this difference in outcome would be substantial.
Assuming arguendo that the imposition of the screening process

before trial would substantially alter the result of medical malpractice
litigation, there remains under Byrd 75 and the third part of the Miller
test the question whether the state interests in having the federal court
refer the malpractice plaintiff to the screening panel are outweighed by
the federal interest in exempting the federal courts from compliance
with the state screening requirements. Judge Rosenn, dissenting in
Edelson v. Soricelli,76 found that implementation of the Pennsylvania
screening procedure would offend the important federal interests in
"allowing the full and fair litigation to be decided by the jury,"' 77 in
"maintaining the appearance of strict neutrality,"7 8 and in achieving
"the goals of the federal courts in convenience and the economical administration of justice. ' 79 Because the Pennsylvania review panel system had been "a resounding flop," 8 0° the Pennsylvania statute "in its
present form advance[d] no legitimate state interest."'8 1 Thus, the federal interests predominated and the federal court should not have followed the state procedure.
525, 537 (1958). The Court went on, however, to hold that the federal interest injury determination of factual questions outweighed any hypothetical difference in outcomes caused by tribunals
of different natures. Id. at 538. The hypothetical change in outcome is similarly outweighed by
strong federal interests in the case of medical malpractice cases. See text accompanying notes 91-

100 infra. Furthermore, the difference in the nature of the tribunals-federal court versus state
review panel-is integrated by the parties' option to proceed in ordinary trial court following
review. Likewise, the Court in Byrd noted that the probability of different results from a judge's
and a jury's decisionmaking was reduced by the federal judge's power to "comment on the weight
of [the] evidence and credibility of [the] witnesses, and . . . to grant a new trial if the verdict
appears to him to be against the weight of the evidence." 356 U.S. at 540.
75. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
76. Nos. 78-2627 & 79-1012 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1979) (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
77. Id., slip op. at 37.
78. Id.
79. Id.

80. Id., slip op. at 11, 35. The majority opinion in Edelson noted that from the 1976 effective
date of the Pennsylvania statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.301-.606 (Purdon Supp. 19791980), until September 1, 1979, not one panel had met to consider a case and, of the 2,466 claims,
only nine had yet reached the hearing stage. "What we confront is an ambitious state program in
which the deed has fallen woefully short of the promise." Nos. 78-2627 & 79-1012, slip op. at 11.
See generally Margolick, supra note 4, at 1, col. 1.
81. Nos. 78-2627 & 79-1012, slip. op. at 37-38. Judge Rosenn's argument is fallacious. The
ineffectiveness of the means chosen by a state legislature to advance a legitimate interest does not
detract from the importance of the interest or make it any less legitimate. See id., slip op. at 16-17
(majority opinion).
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Judge Pettine, writing for the court in Wheeler v. Shoemaker,82 rejected the argument that a federal court should appoint its own panel in
accordance with state law and instead chose to "honor the federal interests in controlling. . . the character, quality and cost of the adjudicatory process in federal court." 83 Under Judge Pettine's analysis, which
apparently used the Byrd balancing approach, federal interests outweighed the state interest in reforming medical malpractice litigation.
Judge Pettine strongly suggested that the Rhode Island panel proce84
dure infringed "the federal interest in preserving the jury's role."
Rhode Island adopted the panel review procedure "in response to
growing frustration with high jury verdicts and settlement of unmeritorious suits under the threat of such verdicts. ' 85
It is likely that the federal courts' refusal to require plaintiffs to
comply with the malpractice screening process would encourage forum
shopping and would put resident plaintiffs at a disadvantage vis-a-vis
nonresident plaintiffs able to take advantage of diversity jurisdiction. It
must be recognized, however, that diversity jurisdiction was created as
an alternative to state courts and that the two judicial systems cannot
be identical in every respect.8 6 Inherent differences between the courts
in such matters as pleadings, discovery, and motions, and variations in
judges, courtrooms, and courtroom locations will inevitably lead to forum shopping between federal and state courts by nonresidents. 87 Frequently these differences will put resident plaintiffs at a disadvantage as
against nonresident plaintiffs. Thus, forum shopping and discrimination, which would exist even if screening panels were not required, cannot be the sole reasons for obliging federal courts to refer plaintiffs to
screening panels as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.
The strong federal interest in protecting diversity jurisdiction, described in the next section, outweighs the problems of forum shopping
and discrimination, 88 and, bolstered by the supremacy clause of the
82. 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978).
83. Id. at 229; see Turner, supra note 48, at 23.
84. 78 F.R.D. at 225.
85. Id. at 225.
86. "The federal system is an independent system for administering justice to litigants who
properly invoke its jurisdiction." Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
"When, because the plaintiff happens to be a non-resident, [a right to recover] is enforceable in a
federal as well as in a State court, the forms and mode of enforcing the right may at times, naturally enough, vary because the two judicial systems are not identic." Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
87. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Redish & Phillips, Erie andthe Rules ofDecision Act: In Search of the AppropriateDilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV.
356, 375-77 (1977); Note, supra note 64, at 691.
88. Judges Rosenn and Pettine recognized that the federal court's refusal to refer a malpractice case to a state panel or to establish its own panel would give out-of-state plaintiffs an advan-
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Constitution, 89 prevails over any state interest in the uniform application of the screening requirement. The third part of the Miller test is
not met and, therefore, the Erie doctrine does not require federal courts
to yield to the state medical malpractice requirements. 90
B.

The Supremacy of FederalDiversity Jurisdiction.

Railway Co. v. Whitton's Administrator9 l is the leading case for the
principle that federal courts must protect their diversity jurisdiction
against state statutes that attempt to limit a state-created cause of action
to state courts. A Wisconsin statute creating a cause of action for
wrongful death contained a provision that such actions were to be
brought only in a Wisconsin state court. The Supreme Court held that
the statute's forum limitation provision was not binding on a federal
diversity court:
In all cases where a general right is thus conferred, it can be enforced
in any Federal court within the State having jurisdiction of the parties. It cannot be withdrawn from the cognizance of such Federal
court by any provision of State legislation that it shall only be enforced in a State court. The statutes of nearly every State provide for
the institution of numerous suits, such as for partition, foreclosure,
and the recovery of real property in particular courts and in the
counties where the land is situated, yet it never has been pretended
that limitations of this character could affect, in any respect, the jurisdiction of the Federal court over such suits where the citzenship of
one of the parties was otherwise sufficient. Whenever a general rule
as to property or personal rights, or injuries to either, is established
by State legislation, its enforcement by a Federal court in a case between proper parties is a matter of course, and the jurisdiction
of the
92
court, in such case,.is not subject to State limitation.
tage over in-state plaintiffs, would encourage forum shopping, and would frustrate the state
objective in stabilizing health care and liability insurance costs. Citizens of the forum state, however, in contrast to out-of-state residents, "have the ability to reform their procedures through
their political processes," and the federal interests in protecting diversity jurisdiction outweigh the
concerns reflected in the Erie doctrine. Edelson v. Soricelli, Nos. 78-2627 & 79-1012, slip op. at 34
(3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1979) (Rosenn, J., dissenting); Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218, 228-29
(D.R.I. 1978).
89. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, ci. 2.
90. The Erie issues involved in these medical malpractice cases would, of course, become
moot if Congress abolished the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the federal courts. Congressman Charles E. Bennett of Florida recently introduced a bill to "abolish diversity of citizenship as a basis of jurisdiction of Federal district courts." H.R. 130, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
91. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1871).
92. Id. at 286; see Hyde & Oglesby v. Stone, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 170 (1857). "[Tjhis court has
repeatedly decided that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over controversies between citizens of different States cannot be impaired by the laws of the states, which prescribe the
modes of redress in their courts, or which regulate the distribution of their judicial power." Id. at
175. See generally U.S. CONsT. art. III, §§ 1-2; art. VI, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
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The Whitton rule has found application in two particular kinds of
cases: suits against political subdivisions and suits relating to decedents' estates. The most influential decision in the former category is
Markham v. City of Newport News. 9 3 Markham concerned a Virginia
statute that provided that suits against Virginia cities could be brought
only in Virginia state courts. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that this limitation could not deprive a federal court of diversity jurisdiction. "[W]henever a state provides a substantive right and a
remedy for its enforcement in a judicial proceeding in any state court, a
judicial controversy involving the right may be adjudicated by a
United States District Court if it has jurisdiction under the Constitution
and laws of the United States."' 94 Attempts by the state to limit suits
against political subdivisions or governmental agencies to a particular
unavailing to deprive a federal court
category of state court are likewise
95
of its diversity jurisdiction:
Where... a cause of action exists in a state, albeit the state court in
which it may be enforced is limited, a federal court deciding the
same cause of action would presumably reach a result identical to
that reached in the state96court. The difference is purely in the means
of reaching that result.

Although the federal courts do not have jurisdiction over "proceedings purely of probate character, ' 97 federal diversity jurisdiction
"is not subject to limitations or restraint by state legislation establishing
98
courts of probate and giving them jurisdiction over similar matters."
Federal diversity courts may "exercise original jurisdiction . . . in
favor of creditors, legatees and heirs to establish their claims" 99 even
though "the statutes of the State undertake to give to state probate
courts exclusive jurisdiction over all matters concerning the settlement
of accounts of executors and, administrators in the distribution of estates."10 0 There are certain causes of action, then, that can be heard by
federal diversity courts despite state laws that purport to limit suits
based on such causes of action to a specialized probate court.
93. 292 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1961).
94. Id. at 716; see Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118 (1868); Grady County v.
Dickerson, 257 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1958); Schultz v. Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm'n,
250 F. Supp. 89 (E.D. La. 1966).
95. Sherman v. Ulmer, 201 F. Supp. 660 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
96. Id. at 662.
97. Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 43-44 (1909).
98. Id. at 43.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 44. The federal court, however, "cannot seize and control the property which is in
possession of the state court." Id. See Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946); Akin v.
Louisiana Nat'l Bank of Baton Rouge, 322 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1963); Monogram Indus., Inc. v.
Zellen, 467 F. Supp. 122 (D. Mass. 1979).
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Because the cases applying the Whitton rule involve state attempts
to confine causes of action to particular state courts, the applicability of
the principle to compulsory medical malpractice screening may depend
on whether the screening panels are state courts for purposes of the
rule.10 ' Because decisions employing the Whit/on rule do not indicate
what constitutes a "state court," it is necessary to examine another area
of federal law for such criteria. Removal of cases from state to federal
courts is an area of federal law that provides standards for determining
which tribunals and proceedings constitute state courts. The federal
removal statute permits a defendant to remove to a federal district
court "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction."'' 0 2 Commissioners of Road Improvement DistrictNo. 2 v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway I0 3 supports the proposition that state medical malpractice
screening panels are state courts. Under an Arkansas statute, the commissioners of a road district submitted plans for improvements and estimates of their cost to the county court. The court then appointed
three assessors to estimate the amount by which an improvement
would enhance neighboring real estate, as well as any damages that
might be sustained by reason of the improvement.. The assessors noted
in a book the amounts of benefits and damages assessed. The commissioners were required to file the assessment in the county court, at
which time the county court clerk would publish notice of the assessments and call upon persons aggrieved by any assessment to appear
before the county court. The county court would then hold a hearing
and determine the justness of any assessment of benefits or damages;
this court was authorized to adjust any assessment upon a proper showing by the landowner. Either the landowner or the commissioners
could appeal from the judgment of the county court to the circuit court,
the Arkansas court of general jurisdiction. Upon appeal, the circuit
court would try the case de novo. In Southwestern Railway, the landowner, a railroad company, filed a petition for removal on the day
before the scheduled hearing before the county court.
The Supreme Court, faced with the question whether the Arkansas
county court was a "state court" for purposes of removal to federal
court, concluded that it was a state court because "the proceeding
101. Judge Rosenn, dissenting in Edelson v. Soricelli, Nos. 78-2627 & 79-1012 (3d Cir. Nov. 2,
1979), and Judge Pettine, writing in Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978), argued
that the respective state screening panels constituted state courts that would deprive federal courts
of their diversity jurisdiction if federal judges were obliged to refer medical malpractice plaintiffs
to such panels. See note 113 infra.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976).
103. 257 U.S. 547 (1922). See also Searl v. School Dist. No. 2, 124 U.S. 197, 199-200 (1888).
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before it ha[d] all the elements of a judicial controversy . . . , to wit,
adversary parties and an issue which the claim of one of the parties
against the other capable of pecuniary estimation, is stated and answered in some form of pleading, and is to be determined."'' 0 4 To support its conclusion, the Court noted that the commissioners were the

plaintiffs and the landowners were the defendants in this suit. The
book of assessment and the landowners' written objections to it constituted the pleadings; and oral evidence was to be heard on the issues.

Medical malpractice screening panels are analogous to the county
Railway. The state statutes often provide for
court in Southwestern
"pleadings"' 1 5 from the claimant and the health care provider. The
10 6
proceeding before the panel is clearly "adversary and interpares."'

The panel, like the county court, receives written and oral evidence
from the parties. The findings of the panel, like the judgment of the

county clerk, may be rejected by the parties, and either party may obtain a trial de novo on the issues before a court of general jurisdiction.
The medical malpractice screening panels, then, seem to meet the crite-

ria of a "state court" for purposes of removal. Such factors as the availability of discovery and the panel's subpoena power reinforce this
conclusion.107
Recent cases have advocated a functional approach for determining whether a state tribunal is a state court under the removal statute. 10 8 It is necessary to (1) evaluate the functions, powers, and
procedures of the state tribunal; (2) consider these factors along with
the respective state and federal interests in the subject matter and in the
provision of a forum; 0 9 and (3) determine the "locus of traditional ju104. 257 U.S. at 557.
105. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
106. 257 U.S. at 559.
107. See notes 16-30 supra and accompanying text.
108. See Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1979); Volkswagen de Puerto
Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1972); Tool & Die Makers
Lodge No. 78 v. General Elec. Co., 170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1959). These cases involved
complaints alleging violations of collective bargaining agreements between employees' associations and employers. The complaints were filed before the appropriate state labor relations
boards. The cases held that the boards were state courts for purposes of removal to federal court.
109. Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1979). In Floeterand the two
other cases advocating the functional approach, see note 108 supra, it is important to note that the
litigation in question--suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements--could have been
brought originally in federal court without respect to the amount in controversy and without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). This statutory provision for
federal court jurisdiction indicates a special federal interest in the subject matter of the litigation.
See Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d at 1102; Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1972). This federal interest in the enforcement
of collective bargaining agreements is not present in actions for medical malpractice.
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risdiction" over the type of action prosecuted before the tribunal."t0

Under this functional approach, the medical malpractice screening
panels have many of the functions, powers, and procedures of a court:
the confrontation of adversaries, the parties' presentation of evidence to

factfinders, the right of discovery, the panel's subpoena power, and the
panel's findings on liability and damages."' In addition, the type of
action brought by a malpractice plaintiff-negligence-has its traditional locus of jurisdiction in a court of law. Finally, the federal interest in providing a federal forum to plaintiffs who satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of diversity of citizenship and amount in
controversy (the Whitton principle) outweighs the state's interest in reducing the amount of medical malpractice claims to reach the courts.
The state's interest in providing a "convenient and expeditious tribunal

to adjudicate the rights and interests of parties" to a malpractice action
"is not substantially greater than the state's interest in maintaining any
court system and does not outweigh the defendant's right to remove the
action to federal court."' 2 Thus, the medical malpractice screening
panels are state courts for purposes of removal. If this definition of

state court is applicable to the Whitton principle, it would prohibit
states from compelling federal courts to require pretrial panel review of

medical malpractice cfaims that plaintiffs seek to litigate in federal
court.

13

A federal court should not be hampered in the exercise of its

110. Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 44 (Ist
Cir. 1972).
111. See text accompanying notes 16-30 supra.
112. Floeter v. C.W. Transp., Inc., 597 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1979).
113. Two federal judges have argued that a federal court's reference of a medical malpractice
claim to a state-created review panel would run afoul of the supremacy of the congressional grant
of federal diversity jurisdiction. Judge Rosenn argued in dissent in Edelson v. Soricelli, Nos. 782627 & 79-1012 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1979), that the Pennsylvania review board was a "judicial entity
artfully draped in non-judicial garb," id., slip op. at 24, and "a surrogate for the state court," 1d.,
slip op. at 29. Pennsylvania had not sought to eliminate the patient's right to recover for medical
malpractice but had sought to channel all plaintiffs to a "special state judicial forum," the screening panel. Pennsylvania's attempt to direct malpractice suits to the panel should not be permitted
to deprive a federal court of jurisdiction. Id., slip op. at 24.
Judge Pettine pointed out in Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978), that the
Rhode Island legislature "preserved all the elements of and defenses against the common law
malpractice action, including trial by a common law court; it merely altered the initial format of
the trial." Id. at 221. He concluded that the malpractice mediation panel was "essentially an
adjunct of state court," and that reference by a federal court to such a panel would defeat the
congressional creation of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 222.
Courts espousing the majority view have attempted to distinguish Wheeler on the grounds
that the Rhode Island statute in Wheeler mandates reference to a mediation panel after the action
has been filed in state court. In statutes under consideration by the majority-view courts, the
medical malpractice claimant must proceed to a mediation panel before he brings an action in
court. See Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.7 (5th Cir. 1979); Seoane v. Ortho
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 468, 471 (E.D. La. 1979); e Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465
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original jurisdiction by the states' assertion of exclusive jurisdiction in

1 14
state courts specializing in medical malpractice.'

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Erie doctrine, as developed and refined by Erie's progeny,
does not compel a federal diversity court to dismiss a medical malprac-

tice suit by a plaintiff who has not complied with a state compulsory
screening statute. The screening panel procedure is not a basic right or

obligation, nor is it intimately bound up with one."

5

Compliance with

the screening procedure has only a conjectural effect on the ultimate
determination whether the health care provider is liable to the plaintiff

for professional negligence. The conditions that Erie sought to prevent-forum shopping and discrimination against resident plaintiffsare likely to result from the federal courts' freedom to ignore the state
screening panel requirements. The frustration of these twin aims of
Erie is counterbalanced by the strong federal interest, expressed in the

Whitton principle, of denying state legislatures the power to use statecreated judicial proceedings to obstruct federal diversity jurisdiction.
The ability of the states to condition the enforceability of a claim upon
pretrial review by a state court would constitute an impermissible state

regulation of access to federal courts. The Whitton principle, by itself
and as an element weighing heavily in the Byrd balance, frees the federal courts from state mandatory screening requirements.
John H. Pavloff

F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (N.D. Id.), aj'd, 603 F.2d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 1979). The importance of this
distinction under either the Erie doctrine or the Whiton rule is unclear. Whether or not a claim
has been filed has little bearing on whether the screening process is intimately bound up with
rights or obligations or whether the screening panel itself is a state court.
114. Contra, Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind.), aft'd, 603 F.2d 646
(7th Cir. 1979). "[Tlhis statutory condition of precedent to the filing of malpractice claims within
the diversity jurisdiction of this Court does not infringe upon this Court's jurisdiction." 465 F.
Supp. at 425; see Turner, supra note 48, at 22-23. Turner, and the cases cited in note 113 supra,
distinguish state malpractice statutes that provide for review prior to filing a lawsuit from those in
which review occurs after commencement of the lawsuit. As to the former, there is no worry that
"the integrity of the federal judicial system is threatened by the wholesale adoption of state practices." Id. Under the latter type of statute,
the burden that would be imposed on the federal courts by conforming would be substantial .... Referral of the action back to a state-run arbitration panel would constitute
an abdication by the federal court, while building an arbitration system from the ground
up, without legislative guidance, would cause a serious drain on the court's resources.
Id.
115. See text accompanying note 54 supra.

